Cornell Law Library

Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository
Historical Theses and Dissertations Collection

Historical Cornell Law School

1889

Change of Beneficiary in Contracts of Mutual
Benefit Life Insurance
Myron M. Crandall
Cornell Law School

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/historical_theses
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Crandall, Myron M., "Change of Beneficiary in Contracts of Mutual Benefit Life Insurance" (1889). Historical Theses and Dissertations
Collection. Paper 141.

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Historical Cornell Law School at Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Historical Theses and Dissertations Collection by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital
Repository. For more information, please contact jmp8@cornell.edu.

H

T

CHANGE

S

E

OF

I

S .

BENEFICIARY

IN CONTPACTS OF

MUTUAL

LIFE

BENEFIT

INSURANCE.

B Y

MYRON M.0 CRANDALL,

Class of '89,

C. U. L A W

S C H OO L.

( June, 1890.)

In the case of the Central Bank of Washington v.Hume,
128 U.S.195,the court in its opinion said,-"It is a general rule that a life insurance policy,and the money to
become due under it,beloug the moment it is issued to the
person named in it

as beneficiary,and that there is no

power in the person procuring the insuranceby any act
of hisby deed or willto transfer to any other person
the interest of the person named."
The rule as laid down by the Supreme Court is applicable to the contract of insurance between the ordinary
life insurance company and the insured for the benefit
of of a third party. In such case the beneficiary becomes
a party to the contract,and has a vested right to the
amount which by the terms of the policy is to be paid to
him on the death of the assured,and the rule would

like-

wise be applicable to a contract of mutual benefit life
insurance when

other conditions are not imposed by the

rules and regulations of the society.
We havetherefore,the general principlethat in the absence of expressed or implied provisions to the contrary,
a third party beneficiary to the contract,has a vested
right thereinand the company and the insured cannot

2
change the beneficiary without his consent.
And,secondly,if there is nothing in the contract bylawspolicy,or statutes giving to the company and the assuredor either of them a right to change a beneficiary,
the same principle applies.
To this effect the courts have cited the case of Lawrence v. Fox,20 N.Y.268,which holds

that "an action

lies on a promise made by the defendant upon valid consideration to a third person for the benefit of the
plaintiffalthough the plaintiff was not privy to the
contract,"
But wherever there is a provision in the constitution and by-laws of a mutual benefit societyor in the
statute, allowing a change of beneficiary at the will of
the insured member,that provision becomes a part of the
contract between the insurer and the insured,and the
beneficiary receives a right to the death fund subject
to that contingency;and there being no other objedtion
the beneficiary's interest becomes vested upon the death
of the member.
"A mutual benefit society is not a life insurance
company in the restricted sense in which that term is
used in our statute in relation to life insurance com-
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panies,nor is a certificate of membership in such societya policy of life insurance in the same restricted
sense of the term;yet it is manifest that such membership certificate is in the nature of a mutual life insurance policy.x x x x x x Such contracts are therefore
subject to the rules of law governing life insurance policies,except so far as those rules must be held to be
modified by the peculiar organizationobjectsand policy
of such societies."
MARTIN v. STUBBIUGS,18 N.E.Rep.(Ill.) at p.660.
Benevolence and charity being the admitted purpose
of mutual benefit life insurance companies,and change of
beneficiary,under certain restrictionsbeing thought in
accord with such purpose,the right has been generallyA-.
for,by the statutes of the various states,and specifically set forth in the constitutions and by-laws of such
associations,so that nearly all,and as appears from the
cases reportedall mutual benefit societies have made
provision in their constitutions and by-laws as limited by the statuteswhich vary their rights in this respect from that of regular life insurance companies.
"The right to change the contract by the mutual agreement of the

parties is not derived from the charter
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and by-lawsbut may be either directly or impliedly limited thereby.Unless the power to change is thus limited,
the beneficiary named in a certificate of membershipp
has no vested interest in the fund prior to the death of
the member."
1ASONIC MUT.BEN. SOC.v.BURKHART, (Ind.)
In farther

11 N.E.Rep.449,!Old.7g

explanation of this exception to the gener-

al rule we adopt the language of a learned judge of the
Supreme Court of New York,who said,-"The certificate is
not a chose in action like an ordinary policy of insurance of life or property,in which the right of property
may vest,but it is subject to the terms of the executory contract in which it vests,and to the modification
in the particular respect which the member in the manner
prescribed may direct and require to be made.The certificate is not therefore an executed contract during the
life of the member in the sense required to make it an
effectual promise to him within the principle of Lawrence v. Fox~supra.
SABIN v.

GRAND LODGE A.O.U.W.,6 N.Y.S.R.151 at p.156.

(Same case again before the General Term,and affirmed in
8N.Y. Supp.185 ).
And in another case in New York upon the same question
of vested interest of beneficiary the court said,-"That
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this has been the policy of the law in this state in
respect to policies of life insurance is undoubtedly
true,and if the same rules are to apply to the certificate in question which have obtained in respect to
such policies the point would be well taken.But there
are two differences in the case at bar which seem to
show that the point

cannot be taken.ln the first place

by the laws of the defendant the right to change a

re-

lief fund certificate after its issuance is expressly
recognized where provisions made for

such changeand

the issuance of a new certificate upon the surrender of
the old one;and in the second placeby the express provisions of section 18 of chapter 175 of Laws of 1883,
which by section 16 is made applicable to associations
organized in another statebut doing business in this,
the right to effect such a change is obligatory upon
such association,and the right is given to make such
change without the consent of the beneficiary.These
circumstances take the case out of the ordinary rule
governing the construction of life insurance policies,
in respect to which such features have not existedand
the legislation referred to shows thatbthe policy of this
state in respect to the certificates of benefit issued
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by associations similar to the

defendant is that the

beneficiary shall take no vested right by the issuance
of the certificate."
LUHRS v. SUPREME LODGE K.& L. OF H.,7 N.Y.Supp.at p.488.
The foregoing principles have been followed with butlittle,if any variation in all the states.
Knights of Honor v. Watson, (N.H.)

See,

15 Atl.Rep.125 & note;

Wendt v. Legion of Honor,(Ia.) 34 N.W.Rep.470; Union
Mut.Aid Ass'n v. Montgomery,(Mich.) 38 N.W.Rep.588;
Lamont v. Legion of Honor,31 Fed.Rep.177 & note;Appeal
of Beatty,(Pa.) 15 Atl.Rep.861;Fisk v. Eq.Aid Union,(Pa.)
11 Atl.Rep.84;Titsworth v. Titsworth,(Kan.) 20 Pac.Rep.
213 & note;Gentry v. Supreme Lodge,23 Fed.Rep.718;Presb.
Assur.Fund v. Allen,,(Ind.) 7 N.E.Rep.317.
It has been contended that a creditor of an assured
memberhaving been appointed beneficiary to the extent
of the debtor part of it,could not be removed by the
assured,and a nww beneficiary appointed without his consent.But the courts have universally held that a beneficiary creditor has no greater-;rights under this kind of
contract than any other class of persons,his rights depending upon the same contingencies.The effect of any
other

ruling would be to a great extent to lessen,or
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perhaps destroy the beneficial results of these benevolent organizations. And as a protection to this benevolent purpose the benefit fund cannot be attached by creditors of the insured,nor assigned to them,except in the
latter case there is

a mutual agreement with the compa-

nywhen the provision of the conititution and by-laws
exempting creditors from the benefit will be held to
have been waived by the company.
And it has been held that it would not be fraud on a
beneficiary's creditors

where the insured changes his

first beneficiary who is his wifeand appoints his children new bvneficiar;$u in order to prevent the fund from
falling into the hands of his wife's creditors after
his death.In the opinion to that case the court said,"If the wife had a vested interset,such as could pass
the titlethere is no reason why the benefits might not
have been garnished prior to the husband's death.If this
could be doneit would virtually annul the entire object of the association,and defeat the benevolent intention of the member by appropriating his means used in
creating this fund to the payment of the debts of the
beneficiary.

"

SCHILLINGER v. BOBS, (Ky.) 3 S.W. Rip.427.
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While the constitution and by-laws of a mutual benefit association,and the statute through which it receives
its power- to do business,give the insured right to
change a beneficiary at willthey frequently limit the
range of charitable objects of the association,by requiring a selection of beneficiary from certain classes of
persons which they enumerate. Such insurance contracts
are said to be

restrictive in their natureand an ap-

pointment of a beneficiary outside of the stipulated
classes will not be valid,at least as against a first
named beneficiary.
If the selection is not of a person prohibited by the
general rule of public policyor by the statutes the
company

may waive a restrictive clause in its laws,

and accept such unauthorized designation. In deciding
questions upon this point the courts depend mostly upon
the language of the constitution and by-lawsand the general statutory provisions.
The following extract from an opinion in the

United

States Circuit Court doubtless expresses the rule as
adopted in most,if not all the states as to who may be
a beneficiary under a mutual benefit life certificate.
"The Kentucky cases in which it has been held that the
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member's power of appointment is limited to his family,
or to some portion thereofas a class,are cases in which
such a limitation was found in the charter, xxxxxxxx
But the court of appeals of Kentucky,while so deciding,
recognizes the principle that in these mutual benefit
societies,the member may have as broad a range of choice
in selecting his beneficiary as the organic law of his
society gives him."
GENTRY v. SUPRF3 E LODGE KNIGHTS OF HONOR,23 Fed.Rep.718.
Creditors compose the largest class restricted fvom
beneficiary rights by such limitations.But the restrictions vary,and some contracts will be found quite as
liberal as ordinary life insurance contracts.And where
the conditions are liberalquestions of insurable interestand of wagering contracts present themselves,as in
the common life insurance.
For further informationsee,Maneely v.Knights of BlIftingham, ( Pa.) 9 Atl.Rep. 41 & note;Massey v.Mutual Relief
Ass'n,( N.Y.) 7 N.E.Rep.619;Pres.Assur.lund v. Allen,(Ill)
317; Mitchell v. Grand Lodge,( IA.)

30 N.W.Rep.865 &

cases cited;Holland v. Taylor,( Ind.) 12 N.E.Rep.116;
Whitehurst v. Whitehurst, ( Va.) 1 S.E.Rep.801.
It is the practice of mutual benefit life insurance
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companies to provide some special manner in which a
new beneficiary may be appointed.

This form being part

of the contractthe authorities hold that the association may demand a strict compliance with its terms in
order that a valid change may be made. And in a recent
New Jersey case where the question of strict compliance
was discussedthe court said,-

"It will be remembered

that one of the complainant's by-laws

expressly de-

clares that no act of a menberdone for the purpose of
changing his beneficiary,shall entitle the new beneficiary to any benefit unless such act is in strict accordance

with the laws of the corporation. This by-law con-

stitutes a natural part of every contract made by the
complainant with a member. Its obvious design is to keep
the complainant constantly informed as to whom it will
be liable in case of the death of the memberand thus
prevent it from being subject to litigation by adverse
claimants,and the consequent waste of its benefit fund.
There can be no doubt about the power of the complainant to make such a

regulation,nor that a proper regard

for the best interest of its members requires that it
should be faithfully observed. x x x x x x x x x x x x
The best considered cases on this subject are uniform
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in

holding that the by-law above recited constitutes

an essential part of contracts like the one under considerationand that no person can successfully assert a
right to the fund payable on the death of a member
unless he can show that he was appointed beheficiary of
such member in the manner required by the contract,
and thatin cases where the contract requires the assent of the corporation to his designationhe will acquire no right to the fund unless such assent is given."
SUPRETE COUNCIL AMER. LEGION OF HON. v. SMITH,17 Atl.
Rep.at p. 772.

See also,Daniels v. Pratt( Mass.) 10 N.E.

Rep.166; Vollman's Appeal,92 Pa.St.50; Society v. 1upold,101 Pa.St.lll; Knights of Honor v. Nairn,(Mich.)
26 N.W.Rep.826; Association v. Brown,33 Fed.Rep. 11.
But the courts have held that as it is a m
of form,and is for the

matter

sole convenience of the insurer

they have the right to waive the formralityand from their
actions before the death of the member insurers may be
estopped even from setting up such formality. And where
there has been

a new benefit certificate issued for

changing the beneficiary,application having been made
in accordance with the by-laws of the union,and the president and secretary of the society have signed thq cer-
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tificateand the seal of the supreme lodge has been
placed upon itit is not invalid because the officers
of the subordinate lodge have not signed and affixed
their seals to it.(Fisk v. Eq.Aid Union,(Pa.) 11 Atl.
Rep. 84.)
The association will also be estopped from setting
up such formality when justice

would be sacrificed to

mere form.
"Deceased procured a certificate of insurance
in an organization,making his betrothed the beneficiary,
but retaining the certificate in his possession.She
marrying another,and the certificate having been lost,
he made a statement of the lossand applied for a reissue of the certificate,making his son the beneficiary.
Such application was refused,-the rules of the organization requiring the change to be indorsed on the original certificate; butby the advice of the officers of
the organizationhe attempted to make the change of
beneficiary by giving power of attorney to another to
collect the amount which should accrue under the certificate. Heldthat such akaigs acts constituted an equitable change of beneficiaryand that the son was entitled
to the fund.*
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GRAND LODGE v. CHILD,(Mieh.) 38 N.W.Rep.l.
In the above case the thurt thought that the loss of
the certificate was not the fault of the assured.That
after its loss there was an impossibility of complying
with the rules as laid

down in the

order.And that assured having

by-laws of the

done all he could to

make a new deaignation,and his son being more justly
entitled to the fund than the first named beneficiary,
the maxim ought to apply

that "Equity will consider

that done which ought to have been done."
(For general investigation,see, Wendt v. Legion of HOnor,
34 N.W.Rep.470 ;Mayer v. Eq.Res.Fund,2 N.Y.Supp.79;
Masonic Relief Ass'n v. Laudenbach,5 N.Y.Supp.901;
Martin v. Stubbings, (Ill.) 18 N.E.Rep.657; Knights of
Honor v. Watson,(N.H.) 15 Atl.Rep.125.).
In considering the question of strict compliance
with the form prescribed for change of beneficiary,among
other exceptions to the rule,it has been heldthat in certain cases change of beneficiary by will may be valid.
The rules and regulations of mutual benefit associations
often provide for change by will; but even when the association accepts such change,expressly or impliedly,
where not provided for

in

the contract of insurance,
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it is estopped from insisting on the prescribed form.
However,in either case a change cannot be valid as
against former beneficiaries unless the designation of
a new beneficiary by will is accepted by the company,
either expressly or impliedly,before the death of the
member.But though it be the desire of the association
intent
irn of theassured in regard to a
to carry out the A
change,by will or otherwise, yet such associations have
not the power to consider such change madb if there has
not been a substantial agreement and acceptance on the
part of the insurer and assured.
"The will of L.bequeathed the sum in question to his
mother orin the event of her deathto his brother.
This was in no manner brought to defendant's knowledge
until after the testator's death.Held,that this did not
operate as a new designation."(Hellinberg v. I.O.of B.B.
94 N.Y.580.) And,in another case the court said,"It is controlled by the contract as it was at the death
of the assured.*But in speaking of the waiver of the
contract by the companythe court concluded that there
that
was no proof A2 the intent of assured to make a new
A
designation was assented to by the company.(Wendt v.
Legion of Honor,la.,34 N.W.Rep.470.)
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"M. became a member of an organization engaged in the
business of life insurance upon the assessment plan,
and received a certificate payable to his wife.Upon his
wife's death M.,who had never had any childrenmade no
change in the certificatebut shortly after executed
a will bequeathing the insurance in question to the
daughter of his wife by a former marriage with whom he
resided,and on the day after its execution sent the will
to the proper officer of the lodge,and at about the samev.
apprised the reporter of the lodge of its contents.
The will was retained by the lodge without objection.
At M's. death the lodge refused to pay the moneyunder
a provision in its constitution that in the event of
the death of the beneficiarybefore the decease of the
memberif he shall make no other disposition thereof,
the benefit shall be paid to the heirs of the member,
and if no person shall be entitled to receive such benefit by the laws of the orderit shall revert to the
widow and orphan fund. Held,that under all the circumstances 11. made a sufficient disposition of the fund
within the meaning of such provision;and that,if this
were not so,the retention of the will by the officers
of the lodge without

objection to the form or

manner
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of designation was waiver of any defect or irregularity
in such designation or disposition."
KEPLER v. SUPREMIE LODGE,10 N.Y.S.R.383 ,45 Hun274.See
also,Sup.Council v. Perry,(Mass.)

5 N.E.Rep.634;Kaiser v.

Kaiser,13 Daly 522;Olmstead v. Mason.Mut.Ben.Soc.,(Kan.)
14 Pac.Rep.449;Holland v. Taylor,(Ind.) 12 N.E.Rep.116;
Daniels v. Pratt,(Mass.) 10 N.E.Rep.166; Hellenberg v.
I.O.of B.B.,94 N.Y.580.
Assignment of a mutual benefit certificate is but another irregular form of changing a beneficiary.The usual
rules governing other irregular changes therefore apply
to assignments.And where the contract provides for a
change of beneficiary without his consenta beneficiary
by assignment would be subject to removal the same as
any other person in similar

contracts.

Notice of assignment should be

given to the company,

and if not given till after the death of the member
insured,it will be invalid,and the beneficiary by assignment cannot claim a waiver on part of the companyas a
defense to an action by a former beneficiary under the
certificate properly appointed.
"The constitution of a mutual benefit association
permitted

a change o~x in the beneficiary, but

provid-
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ed that it "must*

be done on a prescribed f6rm of blank,

the signature to which should be attested before a notary,
and the change entered on the books. It also provided
thatat dnsthbenefits should be paid "to the person designated in the application for membership,as shown by the
books, or as ordered by last will." An applicaAti-o

for

membership named his wife as beneficiary in his application,and her name was so entered odi the books.His aptlication also set out that the receipt of the party to
whom he designated his death loss to be paid should discharge the association. He subsequently executed a paper
assigning his policy to one of his creditors as collateral
security;but no application for a change was made to the
association,nor was the assignment made fox k1k

upon

the

prescribed blanknor had the association any notice of
it until after the death of the member intestate,when
both the widow and theassignee claimed the benefits.
11eldon bill of interpleaderthat the widow was entitled
to the fund."
ASSOCIATION v. BROWN, 33 Fed.Rep.ll. See also,
Lamont v. legion of Honor,(supra);Wendt v. Legion of Honor,(supra);Grand Lodge v. Child,(supra);Martin v. Stubbings, (supra);Association v. Montgomery, (supra);Bloom-
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ington Association v. Blue,ll N.E Rep.331;Lamont v. Association,30 Fed.Rep.817.
There has been considerable discussion,and some diversity of opinion as to whether the rules laid down in
the laws of

a mutual benefit associationstating the man-

ner in which new beneficiaries are to be appointedshall
in all cases be strictly construed and enforced. This
depends principally upon the parties to the action.
In one case the court said,-"We know that there is some
seeming conflict of authority on this question,and it
may be suggested that the contrariety of opinion found
in the books,if carefully examined and traced to their
sources,will be found to have originated in the differences of the parties to tha actions of this character."
TITSWORTH v. TITSWORTH,(Kan.) 20 Pac.Rep. at p.216.
In an action by or against the company,on a question
of attempted change of beneficiary,it has the right,unless estopped,to insist on a strict compliance with the
form prescribed.This is so because these rules
"4Ae

are z4ome

terms of the contract.And the adjudications upon

the subject hold

that a strict enforcementin most cases

is reasonableand for the good of

the association

as wellas those who receive its benefits.
But where the company,assuming that the fund is due to

someone,pays the money into courtand by bill of interPleader substitutes one of the contesting beneficiaries,ift
in its placeit is held to have waived its right to insist upon the particular mode of designation,and where
an irregular though substantial change of beneficiary
has been madewith the knowledge of the insurersand
without their objection,and before thu death of assured, the
the beneficiary first named cannot insist upon a strict
compliance with the rules,because his interest was
subject to defeasance at the will of the

company and

assured,by the terms of the contractand if the contract
allowed a changeit could be accomplished in whatever
manner theyagreed upon,the usual mode being waived.
But where the assured makes an attempted change
which is not assented to ,either expressly or impliedly,
by the insurersbefore his deathor even if the change
is but slightly defective and the company has not assented
to itthe first named beneficiary who has been properly
designated,having acquired certain rights on the death
of the membermay insist on a strict conformity to the
contracteven though the company is willing to carry
out the intention of the deceased member.
But in Knights of Hon.v.Nairn,(supra),the court said,
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"It is possible x x x that when a member has executed
and delivered to the reporter his attested surrender,
in favor of a competent beneficiary,his deathbefore a
new certificate was rendered,may leave his power of
deaignation so far executed as to enable a court of
equityb to relieve as against the accident."
The above principles governing the performance of
rules for change of beneficiaryare derived from an
examination of all the cases on the subject,including
change by testamentary provision,change by assignment,
and other irregular methods.They do not appesr to have
been laid down in a collective form in any adjudicated
case thus far cited in the digests.
Recent enactments giving

the assured pawsxx enlarged

powers in changing his beneficiary,have been the cause
of a nice discussion as to whether rights of a beneficiary appointed under the provisions of a former statute,
are lessened or taken away by subsequent enactments restricting such beneficiary's rights.The conclusion
reached in the courts of Massachusettsand it has not
been established otherwise in

the courts of other

states,is,that such rights are not lessened by the
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enactment of such statutesand they may operate upon
certificates issued

before their enactment ,as well

as after.
And secondlywhether the additional powers are,
or aRNiwi are not incorporated into the laws of the
societyany use of them by a member which is acquiesced
in by the company,will be valid.
This can only be where the beneficiary has such a
right under the contract as may be defeated at the will
of the companr
argued that

and the assured.And the

courts have

. the beneficiary in a contract of this

kind,not having a vested interest in the fundcannot
be said to be injured in respect to his rights under the
contractby a subsequent enactment giving the member
enlarged powers of designation.
"At the time of issuing a certificate of membership
in a beneficiary corporation the statute in force (Public Stat.Mass.c.l15,par.8,4 authorized such corporations
to establish a fund for the purpose of assisting"the
widowsorphans,or other persons dependent upon deceased
members." Statute 1882,c.195,enlarged the powers of
such corporations by adding to the class of beneficiaries "other relations" of deceased mernbers.It did not
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appear that defendant corporation had formally adopted
the provisions of the latter statutes,but it stood ready
to pay the fund to the plaintiffthe mother of the member,
who bad substituted heras beneficiary in place of his
wifeafter the passage of that statute. Held thatit
could not be objected that the corporation was not authorized to make such disposition of the fund."
And in the

opinion to this casethe court said,

"All that a beneficiary has during the life of the
member who holds the certificate is a mere expectancy,
which gives no vested right in the anticipated benefit,
and is not propertyas,owing to his right of revocation,
it is dependent on the will and pleasure of the holder."
"As the beneficiary has only an expectancy,it would
seem that a law changing the persons to whom benefits
might be designated,and enlarging their numberwould
apply to certificates issued before it took effect,as
well as to those subsequently issued.'
MARSH v. SUPREME COUNCIL A.L.OF H.,( Mass.) 13 N.E.Rep.840;
(Decided in 1889).
The court in this case overruled Elsey v. Association,
(Mass.)7 N.E.Rep.840,and Tyler v. Association,(Mass.)
13 N.E.Rep.060,because in those cases

the

statute of
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1 882,referred

to above,was

not observed in the consid-

eration of those cases.
The case of Supreme Council v. Smith,cited on page 11
of this thesis,arose from the b

statute just refereed

to.The courts of New Jersey are not,as would at first
appear,in opposition to the doctrine laid down in
Harsh v.Supreme Council, (supra), though it would seem
that if the learned judge who wrote the opinion in that
casehad read the opinion

to Harsh v.Supreme Council,

he would not have based his authority upon the two
overruled cases mentioned abovethe lateness of both
the Massachusetts case,and the New Jersey case probably accounts for

the oversight.

In the former case the company stood ready to pay the
benefit to the beneficiary newly appointed from the
additional class which the statute of 1882 contained.
In the latter case the company refused to accept the
newly designated beneficiary,so in that case the first
named beneficiary was not legally superseded, there
having been no agreement between the company and the
member as to the second named beneficiary.The follo-iing
is an extract from the opinion to Sup.Council v. Smith.
"When the complainant first acquired corporate existence,
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its power over its benefit fund was limited to making
contracts to pay the fund to the widows and orphans
Of deceased members and other persons dependent on
deceased members.As already stated,its power was enlargcd in 1882 so as to givei±

it capacity to make

contracts to pay its fund to other relatives of deceased
members besides widows and orphans.But in making its
contract with H.Henry Smith it did not exercise this
enlarged power. x x x x x The complainant undoubtedly
had capacity,when it made the contract in question,
to agree to pay other relatives of Smith than those
constituting his family,but the question is not what
contract the complainant might have made,but what
contract did it

make? In my judgment,, M.Henry Smith

had no right or power under the contractto appoint
his brother,Thomas,his beneficiary without the consent
of the complainant;and,as it appears that the

complain-

ant refused to consent to such an appointment,it must
be held that Thomas has no right to the fund in question."
See also,Byrne v.Casey,(Tex.) 8 S.W.Rep38;Order of
Forresters v. Callahan,(Mass.) 16 N.E.Rep.14;Supreme
Council v. Morrison,(R.I. ) 17 Atl.Rep.57;Splawn v.Chew,
60 Tex.534;Legion of Hon.v.Periy,(Mass.)

5 N.E.Rep.634.
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As appears from the cases,contracts of ordinary,
and mutual benefit life insurance differ from each
other in consequence of additional provisions in the
latter contract.
Primarily they are the same,unless a distinction is
made in regard to their purpose.
But from the nature of mutual benefit life insurance,
the practice has necessarily been to insert conditions
in the contract whereby the vested interest which a
beneficiary would ordinarily get,is made contingent
upon the will of the company and the member,and only
vests when the death of the member places an obsticle
in the way of farther action.
Upon the question of vested interest,therefore,depends
the right of a member of a mutual benefit society to
change his beneficiary,and it runs through most every
point in

this subject.
Myron M.

Crandall.

